



A Theory of Non-Universal Laws

Laws in the special sciences are usually regarded to be non-universal. Due to their non-universality, theories of laws in the special sciences face two challenges: (I) According to Lange’s dilemma, they are either false or trivial; (II) they have to meet the Requirement of Relevance. I argue that both challenges can be meet, if one distinguishes four dimensions of (non-)universality. In the upshot, I argue for the following explication of special science laws: L is a special science law iff (1) L is a system law, (2) L is backed up a methodology to describe disturbing factors and (3) L is invariant.  

1. Introduction: Why we need a Theory of Non-Universal Laws
Most philosophers are convinced that physics states universal laws, while the special sciences (e.g., biology, psychology, sociology, economics, medical science etc.) state non-universal or ceteris paribus laws (henceforth, cp-laws).​[1]​ In physics and the special sciences, laws are important because they are statements used to explain and to predict phenomena, and to support counterfactuals etc. Statements that play this role in the sciences I call lawlike​[2]​. 
	Let me provide two examples of special science laws. An example from economics is the law of supply and demand, which – in the words of John Roberts, a critic of cp-laws – states:

“If the supply of a commodity increases (decreases) while the demand for it stays the same, then the price decreases (increases); if the demand for a commodity increases (decreases) while the supply remains the same, then the price increases (decreases).”​[3]​  

Another example is the area law in island biogeography:

	“the equilibrium number S of a species of a given taxonomic group on an island 	(as 	far as creatures are concerned) increases [polynomially]​[4]​ with the islands 	area [A]: 	S = cAz. The (positive-valued) constants c and z are specific to the 	taxonomic group and island group.” (Lange 2000, 235f; see Lange 2002, 	416f.)

Generalizations like these are believed to be lawlike, although they are not universal generalizations. But, traditionally​[5]​, the most important feature of a law to understand its lawlikeness is universality. Picturing lawlikeness mainly in terms of universality has lead many theories of causation and explanation to rely on universal laws. This assumption turns out to be problematic: If we are not able to provide an explication of non-universal laws, then (at least) the philosophy of the special sciences faces a severe problem concerning causation and explanation in its domains. Many theories of causation​[6]​ and explanation​[7]​ (in their standard form) presuppose universal laws of nature. 
	The problem stemming from many theories of causation and explanation consists in a logical tension between three assumptions:

(1)	The special sciences (a) refer to causes in their domains and (b) provide explanations in their domains.
(2)	It is a plain fact that the special sciences – possibly, in contrast to physics – cannot rely on universal laws.​[8]​
(3)	Most philosophical theories of causation and explanation essentially presuppose universal laws. 

This tension can be formulated as the nomothetic dilemma of causality and explanation​[9]​:

First horn: If it is a plain fact that the special sciences cannot rely on universal laws (assumption 2) and if most philosophical theories of causation and explanation essentially involve universal laws (assumption 3), then there is no causation and, as well, no explanation in the special sciences (negation of assumption 1). 

Second horn: If there is causation and, as well, explanation in the special sciences (assumption 1) and if it is a plain fact that the special sciences cannot rely on universal laws (assumption 2), then there is causation and explanation that does not involve universal laws (negation of assumption 3).

If we do not want to give up the immensely plausible opinion that social scientists refer to causes and provide explanations (assumption 1) for purely philosophical reasons, then we are in need of a theory of non-universal laws. So, I will opt for the second horn of the nomothetic dilemma. 
	In this paper, I argue as follows: In section 2, I will introduce Lange’s Dilemma stating that non-universal laws are either false or trivially true. In section 3, I refer to an attempt to avoid Lange’s Dilemma proposed by Pietroski & Rey (1995). Pietroski and Rey attempt to save a cp-law L from being trivially true by explaining counter-instances to L. Although this account has been criticized on good grounds, I think the basic idea is fairly correct. Even its critics, Earman & Roberts (1999), show a way to repair the account by Pietroski and Rey. Earman and Roberts require that a story has to be told about the relevance of the antecedent for the consequent of a law statement (Requirement of Relevance). I try to fulfill this requirement. In the central section 4, I set up a theory of non-universal laws by distinguishing different meanings (or dimensions) of “non-universal”. In section 5, I argue that this approach (a) allows to avoid Lange’s Dilemma and (b) that it meets Roberts and Earman’s Requirement of Relevance in terms of invariance. In section 6, I argue that the results of the preceding sections amount to this theory of special science laws: L is a special science law iff (1) L is a system law, (2) L is backed up a methodology to describe disturbing factors and (3) L is invariant. 

2. Challenge I: Falsity and Triviality 
A philosophical reconstruction of non-universal laws faces a severe problem, which can be articulated in the form of Lange’s Dilemma​[10]​. Here is the first horn:
	
	First horn (Falsity): Strictly speaking, non-strict laws are false because it is not 	the case that all Fs are Gs (if that is what the law says). 

The relationship between supply and price is not always as the law of supply and demand says (or, as it seems to say prima facie), because an interfering factor might occur. In other words, special science laws that instantiate perfect regularities are – mildly put – “scarce” (Cartwright 1983, 45). Suppose that the law is to be formalized as a universally quantified conditional sentence. Then one counter-instance (due to a disturbing factor) to the universally quantified sentence means that it is false.   	
	Here is the second horn of Lange’s Dilemma:

	Second horn (Triviality): If laws in the social sciences are cp-laws, then they are 	trivially true.

If we instead suppose that an implicit cp-clause is attached to the law then it seems to mean ‘All Fs are Gs, if nothing interferes’. But then the cp-law in question is in danger to lack empirical content. It lacks empirical content because it seems to say nothing more than ‘All Fs are Gs or not-(All Fs are Gs)’. If this is the correct theory of cp-laws in the social sciences, then cp-laws are analytically true sentences and, therefore, trivially true. Obviously, this is a bad result because laws of special science should be reconstructed as empirical statements – not as sentences being true in virtue of meaning of their components. Note that the second horn is a more pressing problem than the first, because I have already given up the assumption that special science laws are universal (as presupposed in the first horn). In the recent debate, some philosophers take Lange’s Dilemma as a reason to be pessimistic about whether there really is a convincing explication of laws in the special sciences (cf. Earman & Roberts 1999, 470f). So, to deal with this dilemma is a central challenge.


3. Challenge II: Requirement of Relevance
Pietroski and Rey (1995: 92) claim that it is sufficient for a law “cp: (x) Ax  Cx” to avoid Lange’s Dilemma by endorsing the following conditions: 

(1)	A and C are nomological predicates.​[11]​
(2)	Assessing a law statement “(x) Ax  Cx” leads to a commitment: Explanatory-Commitment-Condition (ECC): If a counter-instance (A & ¬C) to a law L statement occurs, then one is committed to explain ¬C independently of L. 
(3)	There is at one case of either (i) Ax&Cx, or (ii) Ax&¬Cx and ECC is satisfied.

According to Pietroski and Rey (1995: 90), ¬C is explained independently of L if (a) the explanations does not contain any statements that are a logical consequence of L (i.e. logical independence) and (b) the explanation cites does not cite any factors that are effects of ¬C (i.e. causal independence). Critics of this approach argued that ECC is not sufficient for saving special science laws from Lange’s Dilemma, because ECC allows that (1) A is completely irrelevant for C and (2) ¬C is still perfectly explained independently of L (see Schurz 2001: 366f, Earman & Roberts 1999: 453f). Earman and Roberts provide the following counterexample: 

	”Unfortunately, [Pietroski’s and Rey’s proposal] is not sufﬁcient for the non-	vacuous truth of the cp-law. To see why, let “Fx” stand for “x is spherical”, and 	let 	“Gy” stand for y = x and y is electrically conductive”. Now, it is highly plausible 	that for any body that is not electrically conductive, there is some fact about it – 	namely its molecular structure – that explains its non-conductivity, and that this fact 	also explains other facts that are logically and causally independent of its non-	conductivity – e.g., some of its thermodynamic properties. Thus, clauses (ii) and 	(iii) [i.e. the assumptions that the law has at 	least one positive instance A&C and A 	and C are nomological predicates] appear to be easily satisﬁed. If Pietroski and 	Rey’s proposal were correct, then it would follow that ceteris paribus, all spherical 	bodies conduct electricity.” (Earman and Roberts 1999, 253)

Earman and Roberts comment on their counterexample:

	“The general moral of this observation seems to be that it is not enough simply to 	require, […] that when cp:(A→B), any case of A accompanied by ∼B must be 	such that there is an independent explanation of ∼B. This is because this 	requirement does not guarantee that A is in any way relevant to B, which surely 	must be the case if cp:(A→B) is a law of nature. Perhaps Pietroski and Rey’s 	proposal could be modiﬁed to remedy this defect. (Earman & Roberts 1999: 254, 	my emphasis)

My theory of non-universal laws is an attempt to explain what “relevance” means and to save (a version of) ECC at the same time. I agree with the critics that ECC cannot be sufficient. But I will argue that Pietroski and Rey basically had the right idea. More precisely, I will argue in a twofold manner: On the one hand, it is correct that something close to ECC is necessary for a theory of special science laws. It is necessary for dealing with disturbing factors (see section 4.2). On the other hand, Earman, Roberts and Schurz are completely justified to demand that we have to account for the relevance of the antecedent for the consequent of a law statement. I will provide such an account of relevance in terms of stability (see section 4.3). 

4. Four Dimensions of Non-Universal Laws
In the special sciences, laws appear to be non-universal – or, ‘they have exceptions’. But what does it mean to be universal, and, respectively, non-universal? Surprisingly, in the recent debate on cp-laws this question is not answered in a systematic way.​[12]​ The lack of a systematic approach is a major problem, because universality is an ambiguous concept. We may distinguish four meanings or dimensions of universality​[13]​ with respect to a law statement: 
 
(1)	First Dimension – Universality of space and time: Laws are universal1 iff they hold for all space-time regions.
(2)	Second Dimension – Universality of Domain of Application: Laws are universal2 iff they hold for all (kinds of) objects.
(3)	Third Dimension – Universality for External Circumstances: Laws are universal3 iff they hold under all external circumstances (i.e. circumstances that are not referred to by the law statement itself).
(4)	Fourth Dimension – Universality with respect to the Values of Variables: Laws are universal4 iff they hold for all possible values of the variables​[14]​ in the law statement. Universality in this sense acknowledges that laws usually are quantitative statements (and, thus, the predicates contained in these statements are to be conceived as variables ranging over a set of possible values).

I will argue that laws in the special sciences are (a) universal in the first and second dimension and (b) non-universal with respect to the third and the fourth dimension of universality. This diagnosis amounts to a challenge: Any theory of cp-laws is obliged to explain for each dimension how a cp-law can be non-universal3&4 and still play a lawlike role.

4.1 Universality1 & 2: System Laws
Are special science laws universal in the first and the second dimension of universality? I think, the answer is yes. Why? Usually, generalizations in the special sciences are interpreted as system laws. System laws – as opposed to fundamental natural laws – refer to particular systems of a certain (biological, psychological, social etc.) kind K.​[15]​ Hence the application of special science laws might be restricted to a limited space-time region where the objects of a certain kind K exist. 
	Does this characterization of system laws mean that special science laws are non-universal1? No. Because a generalization G does not have an application in some space-time region s, it does not mean that the law does not hold at s. In order to be truly non-universal1, G would have to be conform to a thought experiment of “Smith’s Garden” by Tooley:

	“All the fruit in Smith’s garden at any time are apples. When one attempts to 	take an orange into the garden, it turns into an elephant. Bananas so treated 	become apples as they cross the boundary, while pears are resisted by a force 	that cannot be overcome. Cherry trees planted in the garden bear apples, or they 	bear nothing at all. If all these things were true, there would be a very strong 	case for its being a law that all the fruit in Smith’s garden are apples. And this 	case would be in no way undermined if it were found that no other gardens, 	however similar to Smith’s garden in all other respects, exhibited behaviour of 	the sort just described.” (Tooley 1977: 686, my emphasis)
   
Laws that are truly non-universal1 would be similar to the laws that true of various fruit in Smith’s garden. But it seems to be a far too strong claim that laws in the special sciences are local in a way as the laws in Smith’s garden are. Thus, it seems to be a more promising option to say that (a) special science laws are non-universal1 and (b) these laws simply lack application in some space-time regions. For instance, to say that the law of supply does not hold on mars because there are no people buying and selling goods does not mean that the law of supply is a local law. It just means that the law of supply cannot be applied on mars.   
	Does this characterization of system laws mean that special science laws are non-universal2? No. At first glance, special science laws viewed as system laws appear to be clearly non-universal2: Special science laws quantify over a domain of objects of a certain kind – not over a domain of objects of all kinds. For instance, the law of supply is about commodities – not about everything. So, the domain of special science is a restricted domain. But is this really true? The law of supply can be formalized as quantifying over a restricted domain: 

	“(commodities c): (supply increases)c  (price decreases)c”. 

But there is an alternative, equivalent formalization that quantifies over a domain of all objects. This formalization interprets the kind of object (here: commodities) as a predicate and not as a restriction of the domain: 
	
	“(x): (supply increases)x & (commodity)x  (price decreases)x”.  

The second, unrestricted formalization of the law of supply is a way to save universality2. Formalizing special science laws in this form, reconstructs them as laws that hold for all objects.
	Obviously, I do not offer a theory for the first and second dimension of universality. Such a theory would have to elucidate why generalizations that are universal1&2 are lawlike. All I did was to describe that special science laws are universal1&2. In the following sections, I will argue that general statements play a lawlike role, if they can deal with disturbing factors (dimension 3) and different initial conditions (dimension 4). In other words, all the work is to be done by theories of non-universality3&4.

4.2 Non-Universality3: The Method of quasi-Newtonian Laws
How shall we deal with the third dimension, i.e. the fact that special science laws are sensitive to external factors? Recall that Lange’s dilemma only applies to those reconstructions of law statements that are qualified by a cp-clause like ‘all disturbing factors are absent’. But one is not committed to this reading. Is there an alternative reconstruction? My positive thesis is:

	Positive Thesis: cp-laws are backed up by a methodology which allows to 	describe (comparatively or quantitatively) the influence of relevant disturbing 	factors.

I will introduce three methodologies in order to argue for my positive thesis: the method of quasi-Newtonian laws. The positive thesis is a version of ECC. Describing the influence of disturbing factors on the system described by a law L is fairly close to (or a special case of) explaining the counter-instances of L – as ECC states.
	The basic idea of the method of quasi-Newtonian laws is: Factors that lead to a counter-instance of the law L have to be described by other laws. Note that typically laws are not isolated but part of a theory or a model. Some disturbing factor with respect to law L is described by law L* in the same theory or model. This key idea of dealing with disturbing factors has been proposed by John Stuart Mill: 

	“The disturbing causes have their laws, as the causes which are thereby 	disturbed 	have theirs; and from the laws of disturbing causes, the nature and amount of the 	disturbance may be predicted a priori, like the operation of the more general laws 	which they are said to modify or disturb, but which they might more properly said 	to be concurrent.” (Mill 1836/2008, 50)

For instance, the law of supply states: “If the supply of a commodity increases (decreases), then the price decreases (increases)”. It is usually added “… while the demand for it stays the same” which implies that the law of supply does not hold if the demand increases or decreases. At this point it is crucial to notice that the evolution of the price of a good is not described by a single generalization, i.e. by the law of supply. The evolution of the price also depends on another factor, the demand of a good, described by the law of demand: “if the demand for a commodity increases (decreases) while the supply remains the same, then the price increases (decreases)”. It is to be emphasized that the equilibrium model of supply and demand also describes what would happen, if demand does not remain the same.
	In order to illustrate Mill’s original idea how a disturbing factor can also be described by a law, I draw on Maudlin’s (2004) concept of a quasi-Newtonian law. In Newton’s physics, Newton‘s First Law describes the inertial behavior of a physical system: the motion of a system when no force acts upon it. Newton‘s Second Law describes the deviant behavior: the change of inertial motion if other forces are present. Maudlin characterizes the general form of Quasi-Newtonian Laws by analogy: 

	“Let us denominate laws quasi-Newtonian if they have this form: There are, on 	the one hand, inertial laws which describe how some entities behave when 	nothing act on them, and there are laws of deviation that specify in what	conditions, and in what ways, the behavior will deviate from the inertial 	behavior.” (Maudlin 2004, 431, my italics)

Maudlin (2004, 434) stresses that special science laws are typically quasi-Newtonian. So, let us apply Maudlin’s idea to the economic case: The law of demand describes inertial behavior; if the law of supply is integrated in the model, then the whole model describes the deviant behavior (of the price). Thus, the law of demand and supply describing the evolution of the price of a commodity is a quasi-Newtonian law. The case is analogous concerning the area law in island biogeography: It matters how far an island is away form the coast – being very far away might count as a disturbance of the area law. Island bio-geographers describe this disturbing factor with the distance law: “ceteris paribus, islands farther away from the mainland equilibrate at lower biodiversity levels” (Lange 2002, 419). 

4.3 Non-Universality4: Invariance
My diagnosis was that special science laws fail to hold for all possible values of the variables in the law statement. They are non-universal4. According to invariance theories of laws, a generalization may be non-universal4 but nonetheless lawlike. The general idea of invariance theories of laws consists in the claim that only laws remain true for different possible initial conditions. A generalization is invariant if it holds for some limited range of the possible values (of variables expressing initial conditions). For instance, the law of demand might be true for various possible unit of a commodity that are demanded, but it might not hold for extremely high amounts of demand (e.g., for a demand of 30 Billion units of any commodity). The decisive question is: Can special science laws be lawlike and still be non-universal4? I think that stability theories of laws provide a positive answer to this question. Furthermore, I argue that stability theories also satisfy the Requirement of Relevance: Relevance can be spelled out as invariance. I will use Woodward’s and Hitchcock’s invariance theory of laws.​[16]​   
	According to Woodward and Hitchcock (2003: 17) and Woodward (2003: 250) a statement G is minimally invariant iff the testing intervention condition holds for G. The testing intervention condition states for a generalization G of the form Y = f (X): 

	There are at least two different possible values of an endogenous variable X, x1 	and x2, for which Y realizes a value in the way that G describes. 

The most intuitive case of a testing intervention might be the following one: X=x1 describes an actual state of affairs while X=x2 describes a possible counterfactual state of affairs. For instance, suppose that Boyle’s gas law – pV = NkT – is true for the actual temperature of a gas g of 30°. According to the testing intervention condition, Boyle’s gas law is stable if it also holds for (counterfactual) temperature of, say, 40°. Analogously, the area law and the law of supply are (at least) minimally invariant iff there is a testing intervention on the island area variable and the supply variable.
	What is the pay-off of invariance theory? Invariance theory does not require lawlike statements to be universal4. Thus, adopting invariance theory seems to be a plausible way to account for the lawlikeness of generalizations that are non-universality4. Further, stability theories are a promising tool to meet the Requirement of Relevance (see section 5).

5. Meeting the Challenges: Lange’s Dilemma and the Requirement of Relevance
How does the distinction of four dimensions of non-universality help to meet the challenges? Taking universality in the first and second dimension as granted (i.e., special science laws are system laws), the theories of the third and the fourth dimension solve the problems. How? Lange’s Dilemma addresses a problem of generalizations that are context-sensitive with respect to disturbing factors. Naturally, I claim that our theory of the third dimension has to deal with Lange’s Dilemma: Quasi-Newtonian laws are describing the influence of disturbing factors. The Requirement of Relevance addresses a problem concerning the relation between the antecedent and consequent of the law statement. In terms of variables, the Requirement of Relevance addresses a problem concerning the question whether a law statement holds for different possible value of the antecedent variable(s). Naturally, I claim that our theory of the fourth dimension has to deal with the Requirement of Relevance: Relevance is understood as stability. I will now argue that Lange’s Dilemma can be avoided (section 5.1) and that the Requirement of Relevance can be fulfilled (section 5.2). 

5.1 How to Avoid Lange’s Dilemma
Does the Method of quasi-Newtonian laws avoid Lange’s Dilemma? I argue that it does: The Method of quasi-Newtonian laws describes the influence of disturbances. It avoids Falsity because the occurrence of a disturbance does not render the law L in question false – instead it describes its influence by another law L*. It avoids Triviality because it is not committed to the fatal expression ‘if nothing interferes’.

5.2 Relevance in Terms of Stability
According to Earman and Roberts, explaining why a counter-instance to L occurred is not enough to avoid Lange’s Dilemma – what has to be supplemented is an account of relevance. I think that being invariant nicely meets the challenge, because relevance is spelled out in terms of counterfactual dependence between the possible values of those variables figuring in L. In other words, the antecedent A of a law L is relevant for the consequent C, if L is invariant (i.e., L hold for alterations of A). 
	Thus, ECC and an account of relevance in terms of invariance are supplements in a theory of non-universal laws.

6. Conclusion: The Explication of Special Science Laws
I have distinguished four dimensions of universality. Further, I demanded to develop a theory for each dimension. The universality in the first and second dimension is simply taken for granted, i.e. special science laws are system laws. The non-universality in the third dimension is taken care of by methods that describe the influence of disturbing factors (Mill-Maudlin-view of quasi-Newtonian laws). We deal with the fourth dimension of non-universality by relying on the notions of invariance. My explication of a special science law is the following: 

	A statement L is a special science law iff (1) L is a system law, (2) L is backed up 	a methodology to describe disturbing factors and (3) L is invariant.

I argue that this explication has several benefits: (a) It allows to avoid Lange’s Dilemma. (b) It meets the requirement of relevance in terms of stability. I dare to conclude that, according to my reconstruction, cp-laws are at least good candidates of empirical general statements playing a lawlike role in the special sciences.
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^1	  I will use “non-universal laws” and “ceteris paribus laws” interchangeably.
^2	  In the debate on laws of nature, lawlikeness is associated with universality (Braithwaite 1959, 301). I use the lawlike differently: a general statement is lawlike if it is explanatory, of predictive use and supports counterfactuals.  
^3	  Cf. Roberts (2004, 159), Kincaid (2004, 177). 
^4	  Lange mistakenly writes “exponentially”.
^5	  Cf. Lewis (1973a, 73-76) and Armstrong (1983, 88-93). 
^6	  Cf. Mackie 1974, Lewis 1973b, Dowe 2000. 
^7	  The DN and IS model directly refers to laws. Theories of causal explanations inherit their reference to laws from the concept of causation involved.
^8	  Cf. Earman, Roberts & Smith (2002, 297f), Woodward (2002, 303), Kincaid (2004), Roberts (2004).
^9	  Cf. Pietroski & Rey (1995) and Woodward & Hitchcock (2003a, 2).
^10	  Cf. Lange (1993, 235).
^11	  Pietroski & Rey (1995, 92) argue that A and C are not grue-like.
^12	  Exceptions are Mitchell (2000) and Schurz (2002).  
^13	  Cf. Hüttemann (2007, 139-41) and Craver (2007, 66-69) for a similar distinction.
^14	  A variable X (in the terminology of statistics) is a functional property  X:Dval(X) of individuals dD of a domain D, where val(X) is the set of possible values xval(X) of the variables (for quantitative variables X, val(X) = |R). For example, temperature is represented by a variable T that has several possible values such as T=30º. 
^15	  Schurz (2002, section 6.1; 2005, section 2).
^16	  Similar approaches taken by Lange’s (2000, 103; 2009, 29) and Mitchell’s (2000) might also work for my argument.
